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IN THE SUPREME CCURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
DAVID MARVIN ECHOLS, 
DefPndant-ApPPllant. 
Case No. 16225 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, DAVID MARVIN ECHOLS, appeals from the con-
viction of the crime of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance 
With Intent to Distribute for Value in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, DAVID MARVIN ECHOLS, was found guilty by a 
jury before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge presiding, of the 
crime of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent 
to Distribute for Value on the 21st day of November, 1978, and was 
thereafter sentenced to be committed to the Utah State Prison for 
the indeterl!linate term as provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and a new 
crial. Counsel on appeal requests permission to withdraw from the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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appeal and submits this brief in compliance with Anders v. Californi; 
386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.Zd 93 (1967). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
According to the facts elicited by the prosecution's witness' 
in the trial of the above entitled matter, the facts are as follows 
On the 24th day of August, 1978, the police of Salt Lake 
City had occasion to serve a search warrant upon the residence of 
one Isaac Paul Wagaman at 140 K Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The police officers involved searched his residence for some time. 
During that search Mr. Wagaman had a telephone conversation with a· 
person who he alleged to be the appellant. 
Some time later Mr. Echols, the appellant, appeared at the 
residence of Mr. Wagaman. Shortly after his arrival he was observed 
to make a movement with his left hand towards the floor and in the 
area where he had stood a small quantity containing ten balloons of 
alleged heroin was found. The police officers testified that they ha: 
searched the same area earlier and had not found any drugs prior to 
Mr. Echols arrival. 
Deputy Jim Duncan of the Salt Lake Cou~ty Sheriff's Office 
testified about the events cited above. Deputy Duncan also tes tifiec 
that he had had some experience in narcotics investigation and that 
in his "expert" opinion the packaging of the alleged heroin indicacec 
that the heroin was being held for sale rather than for personal 
use. His opinion was based on the fact that the ten balloons were 
packaged together as a unit. 
- 2 -
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The State also introduced evidence in the form of a intoxi-
cology report that the substance contained within the balloons was 
i.n fact heroin. 
The defense called as a witness Greg Hayner who .testified 
that he had had considerable experience with heroin users and that 
it was that the quantity of balloons found in the package would have 
be0n n0 morr than a multi-day supply and that heroin addicts fre-
quently buy in quantity where they can afford it. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ADMIT TESTIMONY 
BY THE OFFICER IN THE NATURE OF "EXPERT" TESTIMONY 
REGARDING THE PACKAGING, DISTRIBUTION AND USE OF 
HEROIN. 
Appellant's first contention is that Deputy Duncan lacked 
sufficient expertise to testify regarding the packaging, distribu-
tion and use of heroin. Duncan's testimony was admitted by the 
trial court to support an inference that the contents of State's 
Exhibit #1 ~re held for sale rather than use. The Deputy's qualifi-
cations as an expert in the narcotics field consisted of six years 
with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, four within the Narcotics 
Division, some thirty seminars, some one thousand investigations of 
illegal narcotics, and qualification as an expert witness in three 
criminal trials (T. 103). 
In determining the admissibility of expert testimony, the 
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primary consideration is whether the subject of inquiry is beyond 
common experience so that expert opinion would assist the trier of 
fact. (31 Am. Jur. 2d §180). It is generally recognized that the 
subject matter of heroin use is beyond the knowledge of the average 
person, and expert opinion is admissible to assist the jury in its 
deliberation. State v. Fort, 572 Utah 2d 1387, 572 P.2d 1387 (1977); 
State v. Mason, 530 P.2d 795 (Utah 1975); State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah:: 
135, 514 P.2d 800 (1973). 
In order to give the jury assistance and guidance, a witness 
. 
must have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter about whic'. 
he will testify, either by study of the recognized authorities, or by 
practical experience. (31 Am. Jur. 2d §180). Study may be accom-
plished through professional, scientific, or technical training. 
Stone v. People, 157 Cal. 178, 401 P.2d 837 (1965). The value of a 
university degree has been recognized, but it is not essential to the 
qualification of an expert to testify on subjects within his field. 
People v. Smith, 298 P.2d 540 (Cal. 1956). 
While an expert's qualifications need not be the highest 
possible, certain requisite ones must be shown, and beyond this any 
deficiency in training and experience of the expert goes to the weigh: 
rather than the admissibility, of "his testimony. State v. Macumber, 
112 Ariz. 569, 544 P.2d 1084 (1976); State v. Parker, 515 P.2d 1307 
(Wash. 1973). The trial court has considerable discretion with re-
gard to this matter, and testimony will not be ruled incompetent un· 
less a clear abuse thereof is shown. State v. Mason, supra· See 
- 4 -
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State v. Parker, supra, where expert's opinion held not deficient 
because he couldn't identify three types of cannabis, and State v. 
Prevost, 574 P.2d 1319 (Ariz. 1977), where a detective was allowed 
to testify that quanitity of heroin was held for sale, even though 
he had never actually seen anyone snort heroin. 
Expert qualifications vary with the purpose of the testimony 
in narcn ti cs r.as es . l.Jhere tes tin10ny is e 1 ici ted to identify a nar-
cotic substance, a substantial amount of either technical or profes-
sional training is generally required. In State v. Twite, No. 
15896, (Utah 1979), an officer testified that the substance seized 
from the defendant was marijuana. Despite the defendant's objection 
that the officer was not competent to state what the substance was, 
the Court held that the officer, having been schooled in the identity 
of marijuana, and having Gb tained a Bachelor's Degree in botany from 
the police academy, was qualified to testify. 
Other jurisdictions are in accord with this view, although 
cicumstances of a particular case may lend themselves to a higher 
standard of expertise. In Barnhart v. State, 559 P.2d 451 (Okla. 
1977), an expert witnesss was permitted to testify regarding the 
identity of cocaine over defendant's objection. The Court noted 
that the expert's background in chemistry was extensive, including a 
Ph.D. from Oklahoma State University in chemistry, a major thesis in 
the field of molecular spectroscopy, and experience as an instructor 
in quantitative analysis. A degree in chemistry was ruled to be 
unnecessary for purposes of identification of marijuana in State v. 
- 5 -
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-Garcia, 413 P.2d 210 ULM. 1966), where the expert had a Bachelor c: 
Science Degree in chemical engineering and six years of lab experien.~, 
See also, People v. Chavey, 511 P.2d 883 (Colo. 1973). 
Other courts focus on practical experience and technical 
training as prerequisites for qualification as an expert witness ~ 
the identification of drugs. The Court in State v. Schoultz, 564 P:. 
257 (Okla. 1977) admitted expert testimony regarding the identifica-
tion of marijuana where the investigator had been in law enforcement 
over sixteen years, and had run field tests for identification of 
marijuana over one hundred times. Similarly, a detective in State v.· 
Paulsen, 538 P. 2d 339 (Mont. 1975), who had only about two years 
experience with the City-County Narcotics Squad, but had attended 
law enforcement seminars on identification of marijuana, had tested 
marijuana through use of field tests, and made some two hundred 
arrests, was judged by the Court to be qualified as an expert to 
identify marijuana. In State v. Fretton, 464 P.2d 438 (Wash. 19691 
a lieutenant of the Identification Records Division of Tacoma Police 
Department was permitted to identify marijuana where he performed 
four to five hundred tests to identify mairjuana, and had learned 
the tests through training by the police department, pathologists a~ 
toxicologists. 
Where something more than mere identification of marijuana 
was required, the Court in State v. Hall, 523 P.2d 556 (Ore. 197&) 
ruled that it was erroneous to admit a state police lab technician'; 
· d ·ca rec testimony that his visual inspection of a bag of marijuana in 1 
- 6 -
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only twenty-nine of the thirty-four grams were illegal matter, and 
,:, the remaining five were stems. The Court stated that in the absence 
of a showing of any special ability to figure proportionate weights 
of the various parts of a substance by sight it was erroneous to allow 
the expert's testimony in, and concluded," ... witness ... must 
be shown to possess special skill touching upon the matter of inquiry". 
Id at '>59 
Where an expert testifies as to packaging, distribution or 
use of drugs, his qualifications can be based on practical experience 
in some law enforcement capacity. In State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 
135, 514 P.2d 800 (1973), the defendant was convicted of unlawful 
possession for sale of a narcotic drug, heroin. A supervisor of the 
narcotics squad testified that in his opinion the quantity and pack-
aging of the heroin found indicated drug trafficking. On appeal, 
the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the admissibility of the evidence, 
concluding, "Experienced officers may give their opinions in cases 
involving possession of heroin that the narcotics are held for pur-
poses of sale based upon such matters as the quantity, packaging, 
and normal use of an individual. .. " Id., at 803. In accord is 
State v. Fort, supra, where a deputy sheriff with eighteen months 
experience as a narcotics investigator was allowed to testify regarding 
heroin use, packaging and distribution. The deputy had worked under-
cover, purchased narcotics numerous times, and was knowledgeable 
about "shooting galleries" and the packaging and transportation of 
hero in. 
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Other jurisdictions apply a similar standard to expert 
testimony regarding packaging, distribution and use of heroin, re-
quiring some combination of technical training and practical exper-
ience. In State v. Keener, 520 P.2d 510 (Ariz. 1974), a detective 
was allowed to express his opinion that the quantity and purity of 
drugs possessed by the defendant indicated they were for sale rather 
than personal use. The qualifications of the expert consisted of 
fourteen years in law enforcement, six within the Narcotics Division, 
extensive contact with drug users, special training at the college 
level, training from the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs of 
the Federal Government, and experience as teacher of officers in his 
department. Similarly, a special agent for the Drug Enforcement 
Administration in State v. Moreno, 547 P.2d 30 (Ariz. 1976), who 
had been with the United States Department of Justice for four years, 
had worked as supervisor of six agents, had taken a ten week trainin: 
course, had worked with three hundred heroin cases, and had testified 
in court forty or fifty times, was permitted to testify that users 
generally have one hundred to four hundred milligrams in their possess: 
at one time, while someone holding over one half to one gram would 
normally possess it for sale. 
- 8 -
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?OINT II 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE 
VERDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
This Court has on several occasions stated the rules concern-
ing the granting of a new trial on the basis that the verdict was 
not supported by the evidence. In State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 
:'.~l P Id 7!'1+, 77 0 (1949). ':his Court <>tated. 
The question of 9ranting or denying a motion 
for a new trial is a matter largely within 
the discretion of the trial court. This court 
cannot substitute its discretion for that of 
the trial court. We do not ordinarily inter-
fere with the rulings of the trial court in 
either granting or denying a new trial, and 
unless abuse of, or failure to exercise, dis-
cretion on the part of the trial judge is quite 
clearly shown, the ruling of the trial court 
will be sustained. 
While in appellant's case there was no motion for a new trial, 
the above language would seem to indicate under. what circumstances 
this Court will grant a new trial even in the absence of a motion for 
a new trial. The Court also stated: 
The state's evidence is so inherently im-
probable as to be unworthy of belief so that 
upon objective analysis it appears that reason-
able minds could not believe beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant was guilty, the 
jury's verdict cannot stand. Conversely, if 
the state's evidence was such that reasonable 
minds could believe beyond a reasonable doubt 
the defendant was guilty, the verdict must 
be sustained. State v. Mills, 122 Utah 306, 
249 P.2d 211 (1952). 
It is apparent from these various statements of the law that 
thi.s Court does have the power to order a new trial in appropriate 
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cases. This Court has said that: 
We are not unmindful of the settled rule that 
it is the province of the jury to weigh the 
testimony and determine the facts. Neverthe-
less, we cannot escape the responsibility of 
judgment upon whether under the evidence, a 
jury could, and reason, conclude the defendant's 
guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Williams, 111 Utah 379, 180 P.2d 
SSl, SSS (1947). 
In the case before the Court all of the evidence presented 
to the jury was circumstantial in nature. The only evidence on the 
record that the package was held for sale is the testimony of the 
narcotics officers involved in the case. Their conclusion is based ' 
solely on their observation of the way the heroin was packaged 
(T. 120). Gregory Hayner, a witness for the defense, with estab-
lished qualifications in the area of drug use, testified that the 
quantity of drugs involved was not an unusual amount for a drug 
user, as opposed to a drug seller, to have (T. 173-17S). 
Clearly each case must turn upon its own facts and circurn-
stances to whether or not a new trial is warranted because ther ve:-
diet was not supported by the evidence. Appellant contends that~ 
the case before the Court the verdict was not supported by the evi-
dence and therefore he should be granted a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel for the appellant respectfully submits the above 
entitled analysis of the points of law raised by the appellant and 
requests permission to withdraw, believing the appeal is without 
- 10 -
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meritorious grounds. Counsel for the appellant further submits 
that the foregoing brief discusses all the law applicable to the 
only points that could be arguably raised on appeal. 
DATED this __ day of July, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRAD RICH 
Attorney for Appellant 
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